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Abstract 
This paper evaluates a measure targeted at unemployed individuals aged 20-24. 
The main purpose of the measure is to prevent long-term unemployment by 
guaranteeing an assignment to some labor market program within 100 days of 
unemployment. Municipalities voluntarily agree to offer the guarantee. To 
identify the effect of the measure, we use three conditions: The guarantee 
covers individuals aged 24 but not 25, one fifth of the municipalities does not 
provide the guarantee, and the guarantee existed in 1998 but not in 1997. We 
find no evidence that the measure did significantly improve the future labor 
market situation of the youth, which suggests that early intervention in the 
unemployment spell is not important. 
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1 Introduction 
Acting on a pre-election promise, the new Swedish government declared after 
the election in 1994 that no youth should stay openly unemployed, i.e. not 
participating in any labor market program, for more than 100 days. At the time 
of the declaration, unemployment, including youth unemployment, reached its 
post-war highest level. 
The declaration swiftly came into operation by the government convincing 
the municipalities to offer labor market programs to the youth. A municipal 
program was first introduced for the youngest unemployed, and after two years, 
a similar program even comprised the older youth, i.e. up to 24 years . This was 
an untraditional choice as such programs are usually run by the State (through 
the National Labor Market Board, AMS). But, at the time, the employment 
offices were under considerable pressure due to the exceptionally high unem-
ployment rate, and putting some of the responsibility for the youth on the 
municipalities served as a means of diminishing the pressure on the offices. 
This paper focuses on the program directed at the unemployed aged 20-24, 
referred to as Utvecklingsgarantin (UVG).
1  It was introduced in January 1, 
1998, and is still in practice. In essence, the UVG-program is a blend of the 
conventional features in many other programs as it consists of vocational 
rehabilitation (training), work schemes, and (to a lesser extent) on-the-job 
training. What is novel is the fact that the youth are guaranteed an assignment 
to the UVG-program no later than 100 days after becoming unemployed, given 
that they are still openly unemployed. 
Our goal in this paper is thus to determine the effect of a guarantee for pro-
gram participation on the subsequent labor market attachment. By guarantee-
ing the assignment to a program within 100 days, long-term open unemploy-
ment is avoided. It has been argued elsewhere that long-term open unemploy-
ment might be devastating for future labor market prospects. On the other hand, 
such a guarantee might provide an attractive alternative to regular employment, 
and thereby extend the time the youth stay detached from working life.  
Furthermore, the guarantee may also induce an increased job-finding rate 
among the youth, if considered more as a threat than a guarantee. Black et al. 
(2002) provide evidence for such a pattern as they evaluate the WPRS system 
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in the US.
2 The program implies a ‘guarantee’ for mandatory employment and 
training services to individuals with long expected unemployment spells, and 
they find a sharp increase in the exit from unemployment prior to the start of 
services. 
To identify the causal effect of the UVG-guarantee, we make use of three 
conditions: first, it covers individuals aged 24 but not 25, implying that we 
might be able to apply a regression-discontinuity design for the study.
3 Second, 
the municipalities volunteered for being responsible for the UVG-program, and 
not all of them chose to do so. Thus, an alternative identification strategy is to 
compare the volunteering with the non-volunteering municipalities. Third, the 
data are repeated cross sections, so that we can also compare the behavior of 
the age group before and after the introduction of the guarantee, that is in 1997 
and 1998. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we de-
scribe the institutional settings and the UVG-program. Section 3 presents a 
search-theoretic framework for our empirical analysis, and Section 4 discusses 
the identification strategy. In Section 5, we show the empirical results, and the 
final section concludes. 
 
 
2  The design of the UVG-program 
The UVG-program differs from traditional youth labor market programs in at 
least two significant ways. First, it implies a guarantee for some kind of activity 
within 100 days of (open) unemployment. Second, it is run by the municipali-
ties instead of the National Labor Market Board. 
In 1994, the Government had promised to prevent the youth from being un-
employed for more than 100 days. By the end of 1997, the promise had still not 
been realized for the youth aged 20-24. The local employment offices were 
overcrowded by job seekers, and the caseworkers had no time to help their 
                                                       
2 The initials WPRS stand for “Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services”. The length of the 
unemployment spell of an Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimant is predicted. In order to 
continue receiving benefits, individuals with long predicted spells or high predicted probabilities 
of UI benefit exhaustion must accept to receive employment and training services early in their 
spell. 
3 For a discussion and applications of the regression discontinuity approach, see e.g. Angrist & 
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clients as effectively as desired. Thus, the idea to let the municipalities take 
over the responsibility for the unemployed youth seemed attractive for at least 
two reasons. The local employment offices would be able to allocate more 
resources to taking care of the adult unemployed while the municipalities took 
care of the youth. Furthermore, many argued that a decentralization of labor 
market policy to the municipal level – closer to the local labor market – would 
improve the quality of the programs. 
From January 1, 1998, the municipalities could voluntarily agree with the 
National Labor Market Board to provide the UVG-program for the unemployed 
aged 20-24.
4 Except for minor modifications and a change of name, the pro-
gram is still in practice in 2002. The municipalities have the opportunity to 
either continue or stop providing the program at the beginning of each calendar 
year.  
This agreement implies that the local employment offices are responsible 
for the youth during the first 90 days of unemployment. If the individual is still 
unemployed after 90 days, he or she is sent to the municipal UVG-office 
which, in turn, has 10 days to assign the unemployed to some (appropriate) 
activity.   
The content of the activity varies among participants. The possibility to 
combine different measures in order to adjust the program to the individual is 
novel to UVG. According to studies on the implementation of UVG, during the 
first years, approximately 60 percent of the assignments were into work-place 
practice; roughly 15 percent into training; in the rest of the cases, the program 
consisted of a combination of both training and practice (SK, 1999, and US, 
2000). This approximately reflects the distribution of the traditional youth labor 
market programs provided by the National Labor Market Board.   
The local employment office assigning the individual to the program pays 
the municipality a constant compensation of SEK 150 ($15.5) per participant 
and working day which is meant to cover the cost of administration and the 
actual program. Implementation studies indicate that the actual cost per par-
ticipant has varied considerably among municipalities, possibly implying a 
variation in the quality of the program (SK, 1999). 
                                                       
4 The upper age limit is set to the 25
th birthday: if the individual is registered as unemployed 
more than 100 days before her 25
th birthday , she is covered by the guarantee to be assigned to 
UVG. In practice, the interpretation of the age limit has varied among  municipalities, which we 
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Compensation to participants is not included in the above amount. The size 
of the compensation depends on what the individual received as openly unem-
ployed. Individuals qualified for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits receive 
an amount equal to the UI benefits during UVG. This is also the case for those 
qualified for (means tested) social assistance. If the individual rejects an offer 
to participate in UVG without any acceptable reason, she can lose the benefits.
5 
UVG-participants without any previous compensation for unemployment 
receive a moderate compensation of SEK 1,967 ($203) per month. All three 
groups thus have financial incentives to accept an UVG offer.
6 
By 1999, approximately four municipalities out of five had agreed to 
provide the UVG-program.
7 In most cases, the reason for not providing UVG – 
according to the municipalities themselves (SK, 1999) – was that the number of 
long-term unemployed aged 20-24 was low. We may thus expect the economic 
environment to differ systematically between the municipalities that do and do 
not provide the UVG-guarantee. We will return to how this selection of mu-
nicipalities affects the identification of the guarantee effect. 
We have access to the Employment Service database (HÄNDEL) which 
contains all individuals registered as job seekers from 1991 and onwards. 
HÄNDEL includes information on the length of spells on unemployment, as 
well as data on some individual characteristics, including information on the 
municipality. For a detailed description of the data, see the Appendix. 
Considering the design of the program, we would expect the mean pre-
program unemployment period to be reduced in municipalities providing the 
program. In fact, no one aged below 25 should be observed to be openly unem-
ployed for more than 100 days. The data reveals that this was not the case, 
however. In 1997, roughly 25 percent of the unemployed individuals aged 22-
24 were assigned to a program within the promised period. After the introduc-
tion of UVG, in 1998, the corresponding share was 30 percent. Thus, the pre-
program unemployment was indeed reduced but not to the expected extent.  
                                                       
5 The rules on this issue were clear: rejection will lead to loss of benefits. But in practice, the rule 
was not always strictly applied. According to an implementation study (US, 1999), one third of 
the participants felt that they were forced into the program.  
6 Unlike other labor market programs, participation in UVG could not be used to qualify for 
renewed entitlement to UI benefits.  
7 This figure is based on a survey of the Swedish Municipalities’ Organization, SK (1999). 
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Why the reduction was so moderate is not clear, but the local employment 
offices seem to have been reluctant to assign unemployed individuals to the 
UVG-program, either due to a distrust towards the municipal authorities or the 
relatively high cost of an assignment to the UVG-program for the employment 
office.
8   
Thus, what treatment do we evaluate? In general, the treatment is “being 
covered by the UVG-guarantee”. The UVG-program reduced the pre-program 
unemployment periods for all participants, independent of the program. It was 
not a large-scale program, however: in 1998, a majority of all program partici-
pants aged 22-24 years were still assigned to other programs than the UVG. 
Only approximately 12 percent of all participants were assigned to the UVG. 
The treatment thus mainly consisted of a faster assignment to some of the 
traditional programs but, to some extent, also of participation in a new (and 
possibly better) program.  
 
 
3 Theoretical  framework 
In this section, we outline a simple model of an unemployed worker’s job 
search to illustrate the expected impact of a guarantee such as the UVG-
program. Let us begin by examining the situation without the UVG-guarantee, 
our comparison state. Two issues then affect the value of unemployment: the 
time limit of 300 days of the unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, and the 
possibility to participate in all labor market programs except the UVG-
program. 
From previous studies, both theoretical and empirical, we know that the job 
finding rate increases as the benefit exhaustion is approached (for example, see 
Mortensen, 1977). This is due to a decrease in the value of unemployment over 
time which, in turn, implies a decline in the worker’s reservation wage. After 
the exhaustion date, the hazard is constant, given the stationarity of the wage 
offer distribution.  
In the presence of labor market programs, however, the pattern may be dif-
ferent if the programs can be used to avoid UI benefit exhaustion. Until re-
                                                       
8 Compared with other labor market programs, the cost of SEK 150 ($15.5) per participant and 
working day is high. Recall that the compensation to the participant is not included in this 
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cently, this has been the case in Sweden. The evolution of the job finding rate 
now depends on how the unemployed worker values the program: the more 
attractive is the program, the smaller is the increase in the hazard rate. Theo-
retically, even decreasing exit rates from unemployment could be observed. 
Empirical evidence from Sweden suggests a slightly increasing job finding rate 
as the benefit exhaustion approaches, however (see Carling et al, 1996). 
Labor market programs may, of course, have an impact even after the as-
signment to the program. If programs are effective, they may lead to more job 
offers, implying higher job finding rates and better jobs after participation. 
During participation, however, the search activity is often observed to dimin-
ish, implying lower job finding rates. Better jobs after participation may also 
imply a lower risk of re-unemployment. 
We can think of at least four potential effects of the introduction of the 
UVG-guarantee in this framework. Recall that time-limited UI benefits and the 
possibility to participate in all other programs except the UVG characterize our 
comparison state. First, if the UVG-program is of better quality than the other 
available programs – as argued by the municipalities – we should find an 
increase in the job finding rate and a decrease in the re-unemployment rate 
during and after participation. During participation, the effect also depends on 
how much time participants in the UVG-program can allocate to job search 
compared to participants in other programs.  
Second, the relative effectiveness of the UVG-program may also affect the 
job finding rates before participation, if unemployed workers are aware of 
UVG being better than other programs.
9 If so, we would expect the hazard to 
increase less prior to participation in the presence of the UVG. These effects 
should, however, be moderate, considering that only 12 percent of the partici-
pants were assigned to UVG; the majority still participated in other programs. 
Third, the introduction of the time limit of 100 days per se may alter the 
form of the hazard during the first 100 days of unemployment, even if the 
unemployed workers value UVG as much as all other programs. Recall that 
rejecting an offer to participate in UVG disqualifies the unemployed from UI 
benefits and social assistance. Moreover, supposedly, the guarantee implies that 
after 100 days of unemployment, the probability of being offered the UVG-
program is equal to unity. Consequently, the benefits expire after 100 days 
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unless the individual accepts to participate in UVG. Thus, given that all pro-
grams are equally attractive to the unemployed workers, we would expect the 
job finding rate to increase more quickly in the presence of UVG since the UI 
benefits are now exhausted earlier. 
Fourth, the guarantee implies a quicker assignment to programs and thus, a 
reduction in the pre-program unemployment spells. If long-term unemployment 
makes an individual less attractive for the employers or reduces her search 
activity, shorter pre-program unemployment spells should imply increased job-
finding rates during and after program participation. Such an effect could be 
interpreted as a positive impact of early as compared to late participation. 
In sum, the net treatment effect depends on the signs and magnitudes of 
these four effects. Due to the low assignment rate to the UVG-program, the 
third and fourth effect should dominate. Thus, we would expect to find an 
increase in the job finding rate, at least during the first 100 days of unemploy-
ment. Furthermore, if preventing long-term unemployment is indeed important, 
we should find an increase in the employment rate and a decrease in the re-
unemployment rate even after the first 100 days. 
 
 
4  Identification of the treatment effect 
4.1  What is the comparison state? 
The question in most evaluation studies is what was the effect of the treatment 
compared to what would have happened had the individual not received the 
treatment. The identification of such an effect requires the existence of a no-
treatment state.  In the previous literature, it has been argued that the design of 
Swedish labor market policy during the 1990s implies that such a state is 
difficult to identify (Sianesi, 2002. For a discussion in Swedish, see Carling 
and Larsson, 2000).  
The reason, in short, is that it is virtually impossible to avoid participating in 
a program given that unemployment lasts sufficiently long. The probability of 
being assigned to a program sooner or later is close to unity. The relevant 
comparison state in the Swedish set-up is thus not no treatment at all but no 
treatment now but perhaps later. Consequently, in a strict sense, as long as no 
group is excluded from the treatment, the evaluation studies are only able to 
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The design of the UVG-program provides an exception, however. The age 
limit at the 25
th birthday, and the fact that not all municipalities provide the 
program imply that a no-treatment state exists. The comparison in this study is 
thus between a world with a guarantee of program participation within 100 
days of unemployment and a world without such a guarantee. Naturally, all the 
other programs exist in both worlds. 
 
4.2 Identification   
Having access to repeated cross sections before and after the introduction of the 
UVG-program on January 1, 1998, we can use three dimensions to identify the 
effect of UVG: time, age and municipality. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
  
















Note: ‘Not UVG’ refers to a municipality that did not provide the UVG-program during 1998, 
whereas ‘UVG’ refers to a municipality that did so. 
 
Group A
1, which consists of individuals younger than 25 who entered the 
unemployment registers during 1998 in a municipality providing UVG, is the 
only group directly affected by UVG. Depending on the assumptions of the 
indirect effects of UVG or other changes in the environment, the treatment 
effect can be identified by some of the following equations: 
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i (i = 0, 1) now denote the labor market outcome for each 
group. α
1 compares the outcome of the treated group with the outcome of the 
corresponding age group that flowed into unemployment in the same munici-
palities the year before UVG was introduced. This “before-after” estimator is 
only valid if there were no changes in the overall state of the youth labor mar-





4 identify the treatment effect through compari-
son groups. We may obtain an unbiased estimate of the treatment impact by 
any of these as long as the UVG-program did not indirectly affect the labor 
market of groups B and C, and all municipalities and age groups experienced a 
similar business cycle improvement.  
Disregarding the indirect effects so far, let us consider the implications of 
the changes in the economic environment on the choice of the estimator. α
2 is 
valid as long as the business cycle improved to the same extent for an age 
group in municipalities with and without the UVG-guarantee. If, on the other 
hand, changes in the economic environment differed between municipalities 
but were identical for the youth below and above the age of 25, α
3 is a valid 
estimator. Finally, α
4 will take care of both the municipality-specific and the 
age-group specific business cycle change, and thus appears to be an attractive 
estimator. 
However, UVG may have had indirect or “spill-over” effects on  groups B 
or C. For example, the municipalities choosing not to provide it may have put 
an additional effort into taking care of that age group to legitimate their choice. 
In that case, group B will be affected, and α
2 will produce a downward biased 
estimate of the true impact of treatment, even if the change in the business 
cycle is the same in the different municipalities.  
                                                       
10 The before-after estimator usually refers to a strategy for comparing an individual with herself, 
and thus requires longitudinal data. Heckman and Robb (1985) show that repeated cross-
sectional data are sufficient to construct a before-after estimator as long as the expected no-
program outcome after the introduction of the program equals the no-program outcome before 
the introduction. Another way of stating this assumption is to claim that the approximation error 
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Furthermore, the fact that the municipal offices took over the responsibility 
for the young unemployed below 25 may also have allowed the employment 
offices to take better care of the older youth. If so, α
3 will produce a downward 
biased estimate. In the presence of either of these indirect effects, α
4 will also 
be biased.  
The evolution of pre-program unemployment rates from 1997 to 1998 pro-
vides a measure of the indirect effects. As already noted, the program assign-
ment rate within 120 days rose from around 25 to 30 per cent in group A.
11 
Figure 2 shows the program assignment rates before and after the introduction 
of UVG for all four groups. The assignment rate is calculated as the number of 
individuals assigned within 120 days, divided by the total number of unem-
ployed individuals excluding those exiting unemployment within 120 days for 
other reasons than program participation.
12  
 
Figure 2 The estimated probability of being assigned to any program within 120 days 
















Note: The young age group consists of individuals aged 22-24, the old age group includes 
individuals aged 25-27.  
                                                       
11 By setting the limit to 120 days instead of 100, we make sure that our results do not depend on 
a short delay in registering the assignment.  
12 This is a sufficient measure, since we found the program assignment hazard rates to be roughly 
constant in the first year. 
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As expected, the program assignment rate increased most among individuals 
directly affected by the introduction of UVG.
13 However, the pre-program 
period of the age group below 25 was also shortened in non-providing munici-
palities. Figure 2 also shows that these municipalities were relatively efficient 
in assigning individuals to programs already in 1997, which provides an expla-
nation for why they did not conclude an agreement on the program. The in-
crease nevertheless suggests that UVG may have had an indirect effect on 
group B, implying that α
2 produces a downward biased estimate of the guaran-
tee effect. Consequently, α
4 may also be biased.  
The program assignment rate among the older youth does not seem to have 
changed significantly from 1997 to 1998, however, suggesting that we should 
use α
3 to estimate the treatment effect. A further argument for using α
3 is that 
groups B and D are relatively small, implying a low estimate precision. How-
ever, the main reason why we prefer α
3 to α
2 and α
4 is related to selection: an 
individual’s date of birth may be regarded as random, whereas the decision 
made by the local authorities to provide the UVG-guarantee was far from 
random. 
In theory, we may use the age limit of 25 to estimate the treatment effect by 
a sharp regression-discontinuity design. However, there are two practical 
problems. First, the standard errors increase as we approach the age limit and  
second, the interpretation of the age limit varied between municipalities and 
individuals, implying that in practice, the limit was not sharp. Some munici-
palities assigned individuals close to their 25
th birthday to the program whereas 
other municipalities were very strict about the age limit.  
 
 
5 Empirical  results 
5.1  The dimensions of identification in practice 
The identification strategy is based on information on whether and when the  
individual’s municipality began providing the UVG-guarantee, and the indi-
vidual’s age when registering with the Employment Service (ES). Furthermore, 
the time dimension is based on the date of entry into the ES records: individu-
                                                       
13 The 4.6 percentage point increase corresponds to approximately 18 percent. Most of the 
increase seems to be due to the introduction of UVG; in 1998, around 12 percent of all program 
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als entering during 1997 (1998) are included in the inflow 1997 (1998). The 
following example illustrates the construction of the different groups. 
An individual registering with ES in February 1998 is included in group A 
(UVG-providing municipality, age < 25) if 
(i)  the municipality where she lives has started providing the UVG-program 
some time during 1998, and if 
(ii)  she was at least 22 years in February 1998, and did not celebrate her 25th 
birthday before March 1998. 
Thus, if her municipality did not start providing the UVG-program in 1998, she 
is included in either of the non-providing municipality groups B or D, depend-
ing on her age. Furthermore, if she was at least 25 but not yet 28 in February 
1998, she is included either in group C or D.  
We apply an identical age definition to the inflow in 1997. The municipality 
dimension is now based on the 1998 information: an individual living in a 
municipality that started providing the UVG-program some time in 1998 is 
included in group A or C, depending on her age.
14 
 
5.2  The outcome measures 
We can follow the individuals in the Employment Service records until 22 June 
2000. The effect of UVG is defined using various outcome measures. Since the 
goal of UVG – similar to all active labor market programs – is to shorten the 
unemployment period and increase the chances of getting a job, we examine 






We reckon, however, that the best measure of the effect of the guarantee is 
obtained when the first and (potential) subsequent unemployment spells are 
examined simultaneously. The share of days an individual is registered with the 
Employment Service (ES) as a job seeker within a period of 1.5 years after the 
start of the initial unemployment period captures all spells of unemployment, 
                                                       
14 Individuals in the late inflow in 1997 may have been covered by the UVG-program if they 
knew that the program was to be introduced in their municipality at the beginning of 1998. 
Furthermore, some of the early inflow in 1998 in group A may not have been covered by the 
UVG-program if their municipality did not start providing the program until the fall. Section 5.7 
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employment, and regular education during that period. The variable thus pro-
vides a measure of future employment stability.
15  
 
5.3  The net treatment effect 
Figure 3 shows the share of days registered in the ES records as a job seeker 
during the 18 months period after the start of the unemployment, thus reflecting 
the net effect of the UVG-program on unemployment. The overall decrease in 
the share variable reflects the improvement in the state of the labor market 
from 1997 to 1998. Consequently, the before-after estimator produces the most 
favorable estimate of the treatment effect. 





4 is chosen. In our opinion, the best comparison group consists of 
individuals above 25 in UVG-providing municipalities. According to α
3, the 
UVG-program moderately decreased future unemployment by 0.6 percentage 
points. In relative terms, this corresponds to 1.3 percent. Comparing the treat-
ment group to the corresponding age group in non-providing municipalities 
yields a slightly negative but statistically insignificant estimate. Figure 2 sug-
gests that this result is downward biased, however. 
In sum, we find no evidence for a strong net effect of the UVG-program in 
either direction. If anything, the results suggest that the UVG-program slightly 
decreased the number of days registered with ES, thus indicating a small posi-
tive treatment effect.  
 
                                                       
15 The reason for choosing 1.5 years, or 539 days to be precise, is that we can follow the sample 
until 22 June 2000. Thus, the maximum period we can observe for an individual whose unem-
ployment starts on December 31, 1998 is 539 days. Naturally, it would be preferable to follow 
the individuals for a longer period of time to be able to say something about the long-term 
effects. IFAU – Does early intervention help?  15





















5.4  Dynamics of the treatment effect 
To explore the composition of the net effect in more detail, we have examined 
the duration of the first unemployment spell. We are interested in the probabil-
ity of employment.
16  
Figure 4 shows the change in mean length of the first unemployment spell 
for the four groups. The mean is calculated using results from empirical hazard 
estimations.
17 As for the net impact, the before-after estimator again produces 
the most favorable estimate for the treatment impact. As soon as the develop-
ment of group A is related to any comparison group, the estimated effect turns 
to zero. In other words, the results do not suggest that the UVG-guarantee on 
                                                       
16 For the definition of employment and unemployment, see the Data Appendix. Alternative 
definitions (including e.g. temporary employment and part-time unemployment into employ-
ment) do not significantly alter the results.  
17 In the calculations, it is postulated that the hazard is constant after 1 110 days. 
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average had any significant impact on the length of the first unemployment 
spell.  
 





















However, recall that the theory suggested that the UVG-guarantee might al-
ready have an impact during the first 100 days of unemployment, as the UI 
benefits expire unless the individual accepts to participate in the UVG. The 
results in Black et al. (2002) show that such an impact may exist even without 
the threat of UI benefit expiration, if the individuals consider the program to be 
worse than open unemployment. 
We use the same empirical hazard estimations as presented above to esti-
mate the probability of finding a job within 120 days of unemployment. The 
results are reported in Figure 5. Once more, we consider α
3 to be the most valid 
estimator, and thus, Figure 6 shows the evolution of the hazard for groups A 
and C.  
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Figure 5 The estimated probability of finding a job within 120 days of unemployment. 




















Figure 6 The empirical hazard rates for the treatment (A) and the comparison (C) 
group, 1997 (continuous line) and 1998 (dashed line).  
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The UVG-guarantee does indeed seem to have a positive impact on the 
probability of employment during the first 120 days. At the beginning of the 
unemployment spell, the impact is estimated to be roughly 10 percent, then 
decreasing to approximately zero for 120 days.
18 However, Figures 4, 5, and 6 
together suggest that the positive impact on employment during the first 120 
days is neutralized by a decreased probability of employment during and after 
participation, possibly due to decreased job search, or a “lock-in” effect, among 
participants. Recall from Figure 2 that the introduction of the UVG-guarantee 
seems to have increased the total volume of program participation. Given that 
the unemployed individuals search less while participating compared to when 
in open unemployment, we would expect to find an increased “lock-in” in 
group A. 
 
5.5  What is the relation between dose and response? 
Sometimes the reason for the impact of a treatment being small is that the 
change in the economic environment from the treatment is small. Using the 
terminology of Imbens (2000), among others, the response to the treatment is 
weak due to a low treatment dose. As long as there is variation among units, we 
can explore the causal relation between them by regressing the response on the 
dose. 
In our case, the treatment dose of a unit is the increase in the program par-
ticipation rate in each municipality and age group. The response is the decrease 
in the share of ES days variable. Figure 7 shows the fitted line between the 
mean response and the mean dose of the four groups A-D: An increase in the 
program assignment within 120 days by one percentage point results in a 0.17 
percentage point decrease in the net impact of the treatment, indicating a weak 
response to the treatment dose. 
The standard errors in Figure 2 suggest, however, that we have a relatively 
large variation in the treatment dose among the municipalities. The same 
applies to the response measure, as reported in Figure 3. Presupposing that the 
municipality specific dose is exogenous, we can use this variation on the mu-
                                                       
18 It should be noted that this impact is expressed in percent, whereas α
1–α
4 in Figure 5 are 
expressed in percentage points. Furthermore, the distribution of spells ending on various days is 
not uniform, and thus, summing the impact in Figure 6 over the 120-day period produces the 2.2 
percentage point impact estimated by α
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nicipality level to estimate a similar regression. Figure 8 shows a relation 
between the dose and the response comparable to Figure 7.  
In sum, the results suggest that the small impact of treatment cannot be ex-
plained by a low treatment dose. Even in municipalities where we observe 
quite large increases in the program assignment rate, the response is still weak. 
Thus, shortening open unemployment does not seem to play any important role 
for the success on the labor market during the following 18 months. 
 
Figure 7 Dose-response regression, four municipality groups 
Note: The dose is defined as the change from 1997 to 1998 in the program assignment rate within 
120 days; the response is defined as the change from 1997 to 1998 in the outcome variable share 
of ES days. 
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Figure 8 Dose-response regression, all UVG-providing municipalities 
Note: See Figure 7. 
 
5.6  Is the treatment effect common to all? 
Variation in the impact of treatment across individuals is an important aspect in 
evaluating labor market programs. Individual characteristics, like gender or 
educational background, may be sources of such variation (For an example of 
Swedish youth programs, see Larsson, 2000).  
The goal of the UVG-program – like the goal of most Swedish labor market 
programs – is to help those who need help most, i.e. individuals with a weak 
position on the labor market. We thus want to evaluate this goal by examining 
the variation in the impact of treatment across individuals with a strong versus 
a weak initial position. Initial refers to the state at the time when the individual 
registers as unemployed. 
As an indicator of the individual’s strength on the labor market, we use her 
history in the Employment Service register prior to the actual unemployment 
spell.
19 The more the individual has been registered with the ES, basically 
implying either open unemployment or participation in some labor market 
                                                       
19 A detailed description on how the variable is defined is found in the Data Appendix. IFAU – Does early intervention help?  21
program, the weaker is her position on the labor market. Figure 9 reports the 
results for the strongest and the weakest quartile in each group A–D. In short, 
there is no considerable heterogeneity in the treatment effect between the 
strong and the weak; α
3 produces almost identical estimates for the quartiles.
20  
 
Figure 9 Mean of share of ES days (%) for the strongest (S) and the weakest (W) 


















                                                       
20 One may wonder whether previous unemployment adequately reflects the individual heteroge-
neity by which the UVG-effect varies. And more specifically, whether the absence of evidence of 
a heterogeneous effect is a consequence of this choice. We have therefore made a thorough 
investigation of this matter. We consider five measures of "strength on the labor market": 
previous income, unemployment duration, the time registered at the unemployment office, the 
caseworker's assessment of the need for job search assistance as well as the need for additional 
labor market training. These five variables are put into a measure model and a factor analysis is 
performed for the 1997-sample. The analysis suggests the presence of two factors that we label 
"actual strength" (driven by the first three variables) and "assessed strength" (driven by the last 
two variables). 13 additional variables are then used to predict the factor score for the 1997-
sample through a regression model. The predictive variables relate to education, school-grades, 
family status, work experience as well as previous unemployment history. The regression model 
is thereafter used for predicting the individual factor-score for both the 1997 and 1998 samples, 
and to classify the individual's labor market strength. However, we find no evidence of a hetero-
geneous UVG-effect, and therefore, we decided to present the simpler analysis above.  
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5.7  Additional checks of the results 
Information on whether and when a municipality provided the UVG-guarantee 
is crucial for the identification of the treatment effect. Thus, we have checked 
the result with respect to a number of modifications in the municipality vari-
able.  
In the analysis presented so far, all municipalities that started providing the 
UVG-guarantee some time during 1998 are included in group A. In some cases, 
however, the individual registered as unemployed before the municipality 
started providing the program, and thus, group A may be contaminated. Never-
theless, the results are the same when all municipalities with a starting date 
later than January 1, 1998, are excluded. Neither do the results change when we 
exclude all 49 municipalities in the County of Västra Götaland, since we con-
sider the records for that County to be unreliable (See the Appendix). 
Another issue is whether the late inflow in 1997 was in fact covered by the 
UVG-program in municipalities that started providing the program in early 
1998. The program may have affected the behavior already in 1997 if the 
individuals knew that it was about to be introduced. To check this, we have 
excluded the inflow after September both in 1997 and 1998: the results do not 
change notably. 
Finally, we have tested different age restrictions, as well as excluded indi-
viduals non-eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The results remain 




This paper is an evaluation of a youth measure called the UVG-program with 
the goal of preventing open unemployment spells longer than 100 days; open 
unemployment here referring to a state where the individual does not partici-
pate in a labor market program. The set-up of the program implies three possi-
ble dimensions for identification of the treatment effect: age, municipality, and 
time. We claim that this design allows us to compare a world with a guarantee 
with a world without such a guarantee. 
We have four major findings. First, using the Employment Service (ES) re-
cords, we evaluate the overall impact of the guarantee on the subsequent labor 
market attachment. We estimate a modest decrease in the number of days the 
individual is registered with the ES during the 18 month period after the start of IFAU – Does early intervention help?  23
the unemployment. This decrease, however, is too small to indicate an appre-
ciably more stable transition out of unemployment.  
Second, we find a slightly increased probability of employment during the 
first 120 days of unemployment, similar to the results shown in Black et al. 
(2002), suggesting that the UVG-guarantee works more as a threat than a 
promise. This small positive impact is neutralized by a negative impact after 
the first 120 days, however. Thus, on average, the first unemployment spell is 
not significantly shorter in the group covered by the UVG-guarantee.  
Third, the UVG-program was everything but a guarantee: it implied an in-
crease from around 25 to 30 percent in the probability of being assigned to 
some program within the promised 100-day period. However, although we 
would expect more from a guarantee, the increase is still significant, varying 
among municipalities. Exploiting this variation in the program assignment rate 
between the municipalities, we estimate dose-response functions, and find no 
significant correlation between the program assignment – the dose – and the 
outcome variable – the response. Thus, the negligible impact is not explained 
by a small dose. 
Fourth, we find no evidence that the estimated treatment effect would de-
pend on individual characteristics reflecting the individual’s initial attachment 
to the labor market. We consider this attachment to be better, the shorter is the 
individual’s unemployment history. 
Returning to the question raised in the title of this paper, do our results sug-
gest that early intervention helps the unemployed youth? Naturally, the answer 
depends on the desired impact. In the very short run, the UVG-program indeed 
seems to have succeeded in slightly increasing employment. This small posi-
tive impact disappears in course of time, however, probably due to a low search 
activity during participation in the UVG-program and other labor market 
programs. The UVG-program increased the total volume of program participa-
tion, and thus, more individuals were “locked in” into a passive job search. The 
impact of a shorter unemployment history on employment stability during the 
following 18 months also seems to be negligible. Thus, our conclusion is that, 
at least in this specific case, shortening the unemployment spell does not seem 
to have played any significant role for the individual’s labor market prospects 
within the subsequent 18 months. 
The result that only less than a third of the target group was assigned to a 
program within the promised 100 days is noteworthy per se. To call for a 100 
percent assignment is probably not desirable, since some of the individuals may IFAU – Does early intervention help?   24
have had definite job or study plans in the close future. But claiming this to be 
the case for seven out of ten is unrealistic. The reluctance to put the guarantee 
into effect at the local employment offices may have been due to the offices 
mistrusting the municipal authorities or economic disincentives. In any case, 
exploring the underlying reasons for this result for a future design of similar 
guarantees is crucial. 
Finally, we believe that the identification strategy assures the internal valid-
ity of our results. The external validity of the results is a quite different ques-
tion. For example, we cannot be sure that the impact would have been the same 
for significantly higher doses of the treatment, i.e. if the UVG-guarantee had 
been an actual guarantee of activity within 100 days, or for persons entering 
unemployment after 1998.  
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Data Appendix 
Data sources 
Data for the empirical analysis is obtained from sources included in the IFAU 
database. The population of the IFAU database consists of the entire Swedish 
population from 1990 to 1998. The most important source for this study is 
HÄNDEL which originates from the public employment offices in Sweden and 
contains information on spells of unemployment, participation in labor market 
programs and some individual characteristics, including the municipality code. 
For the identification strategy of this study, it is important to know which of 
the individuals were covered by the UVG-guarantee. Thus, two pieces of 
information are crucial: whether and when the individual’s municipality started 
providing the UVG-guarantee, and the individual’s exact date of birth. To 
protect individual anonymity, the IFAU database only contains information on 
the year of birth. We have given a special order to Statistics Sweden for the 
month of birth for the individuals in our sample.  
Exact information on which municipalities have concluded an agreement on 
the UVG-program and when the first agreement was concluded are not col-
lected into any document. The agreement, if there was any, was made between 
the municipal labor market authority and the local employment office. Our 
procedure was thus to gather information from the local level. 
In 1998, there were 288 municipalities in Sweden. Our first step was to con-
tact the 21 county labor boards governing the local employment offices by e-
mail. 13 of these were able to provide more or less exact information for a total 
of 162 municipalities. As a second step, we then contacted either the municipal 
labor market authority or the local employment office (or both) in the remain-
ing 126 municipalities. Lena Ståhl at the Ministry of Industry helped us by 
gathering the information for municipalities in Stockholm County. Our attempt 
to obtain information from the archives at the National Labor Market Board 
was unsuccessful.  
The first e-mails were sent on November 11, 2001, and by February 15, 
2002 we had received information for 256 municipalities. The remaining 32 
municipalities are excluded from our study. These municipalities are: 
 
Flen  Forshaga Gagnef Gnesta 
Grums Helsingborg  Höganäs  Kil 
Kristinehamn Lidingö  Ludvika  Lycksele IFAU – Does early intervention help?   28
Malå Mjölby  Norrtälje  Nyköping 
Oxelösund  Tyresö Täby Sigtuna 
Skurup Sundbyberg  Svalöv  Svedala 
Säffle Tomelilla  Trelleborg  Vallentuna 
Vaxholm Vingåker  Östersund  Österåker 
 
Moreover, we considered the records for Ödeshög, Ydre and Boxholm to be 
unreliable, and thus, these were excluded. Finally, information for the 49 
municipalities in Västra Götaland County seemed uncertain (all municipalities 
in this area were claimed to have started on Jan 1, 1998) and thus we checked 
the robustness of the results when Västra Götaland is excluded. According to 
our records, 198 municipalities started providing the UVG-guarantee some 
time during 1998. Table A1 shows the distribution of months: 
 
Table A1 Distribution of the starting months for the UVG-program during 1998 















From the HÄNDEL database, we collect the entire inflow during 1997 and 
1998 of individuals born in 1967-78. As inflow in 1997, we define all individu-
als who enter the Employment Service register during 1997; the same applies 
for 1998. Thus, the samples for 1997 and 1998 overlap to some extent. We 
observe the entire HÄNDEL history for these individuals, and we can follow 
them until 22 June 2000. 
Table A2 summarizes the sampling procedure. From the original sample of 
586 653 individuals, we exclude observations with incorrect or missing infor-
mation. INSPER and SOKATPER are tables in the HÄNDEL database. INSPER IFAU – Does early intervention help?  29
contains information on the date of entry into and exit from the Employment 
Service register, whereas SOKATPER includes detailed information on the 
activities, or job search categories, in each registration spell. Examples of 
search categories (variable SKAT, sökandekategori) are open unemployment 
and participation in a program. Dates for the start and end of each SKAT are 
reported in SOKATPER. 
 
Table A2 Sample construction 
  No. of excluded obs.  sample size  
All observations  586 653 
incorrect year of birth
1)   384 586 269 
municipality code missing  25 586 224 
 Inflow  1997 
 375  564 
overlapping INSPER spells
2)  56 210 319 354 
too old INSPER registration data
3) 166 319  188 
overlapping SOKATPER spells
4)  26 013 293 175 
information on whether the municipality 
provides UVG missing 
26 325 266 850 
22-27 years at registration with ES  133 126 133 724 
 Inflow  1998 
 345  781 
overlapping INSPER periods
2)  43 934 301 847 
too old INSPER registration data
3)    162 301 685 
overlapping SOKATPER periods
4)  22 907 278 778 
information on whether the municipality 
provides UVG missing 
24 243 254 535 
22-27 years at registration with ES  119 568 134 967 
1) Year of birth may be incorrect either within INSPER, such that an individual has a different 
year of birth for different registration periods, or between INSPER and SYS9698. 
2) Individuals with fully or partly overlapping periods, periods of one day only, an incorrect order 
of serial numbers, double serial numbers, a negative period length, or a registration date after 
June, 22, 2000 (censoring date) in INSPER are excluded.  However, observations with overlap-
ping periods before the year of inflow and the same starting date for both periods are included, 
collecting only the latest of the double periods. 
3) Age at the first registration must be at least 16 years, otherwise we assume the observation to 
be incorrect. 
4) Individuals with the following incorrect information are excluded: registration date in INSPER 
different from the registration into first search category in SOKATPER, de-registration date in 
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Definition of some important variables 
Unemployment and employment 
All search categories (SKAT, sökandekategori) are included in our definition of 
an unemployment spell. The end of the unemployment spell is determined by 
the date and reason for de-registration (AVDM,  avaktualiseringsdatum, and 
AVORS, avaktualiseringsorsak). If AVORS = (1, 2, 3), the spell is defined to 
end in employment.  
 
Program participation 
An individual is defined to participate in a program if her unemployment spell 
contains a search category SKAT = 42-83. SKAT = 66 stands for participation in 
the UVG-program. 
 
Share of ES days 
The longest possible period for which we can follow an individual who regis-
ters with the ES records on December 31, 1998 is until June 22, 2000, i.e. 539 
days. Thus, the numerator of the outcome variable share of ES days is 539. The 
denominator is the sum of days registered with ES from the date of (first) 
registration. 
 
History in the Employment Service register 
The variable history in the ES register defines the number of days registered 
with the ES records since the first registration until the actual registration in 
1997 or 1998. For comparability, this is expressed in relative terms as a share. 
In other words, the numerator is the sum of all unemployment spells (see the 
definition of an unemployment spell above) from the first registration until the 
actual registration. For individuals in the inflow 1997 (1998), the denominator 
is the sum of all calendar days from the first registration until December 31, 
1997 (1998). Thus, the denominator is an approximation. 
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Table A3 Mean unemployment history in the four groups, 1997 and 1998. 
Group  Share of unemployment days of 
all calendar days since the first 
unemployment spell, %. 
Standard deviation in parenthe-
ses. 
1997   
A
0: municipality provides UVG, Age < 25  35.7 (23.3) 
B
0: municipality does not provide UVG, Age < 25  37.9 (23.4) 
C
0: municipality provides UVG, Age ≥ 25  37.8 (24.7) 
D
0: municipality does not provide UVG, Age ≥ 25  40.6 (25.0) 
1998   
A
1: municipality provides UVG, Age < 25  34.6 (22.8) 
B
1: municipality does not provide UVG, Age < 25  36.2 (23.0) 
C
1: municipality provides UVG, Age ≥ 25  39.9 (24.2) 
D
1: municipality does not provide UVG, Age ≥ 25  42.7 (24.3) 
 
Eligibility to unemployment benefits 
Individuals are defined as eligible for UI benefits if their KASNR = 02-69. 
Thus, KASNR = 00, 98, 99 or missing indicates non-eligibility: 51 796 non-
eligible individuals in the inflow 1997, and 42 841 non-eligible individuals in 
the inflow 1998.    
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